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Modern Montana
Constitution
THE Waldron:
LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY
IN A MODERN
MONTANA CON STITUTION
by Ellis Waldron* **
INTRODUCTION
American state legislatures entered the 19th century with a plentitude of authority, reflecting public confidence in representative assemblies as defenders of citizen interests against royal authority during
the long colonial period. But public confidence ebbed during the middle
decades of the 19th century, as the legislatures proved to be unequal to
the political and administrative tasks of conquering a continental empire. From mideentury, state legislatures were hedged in by a growing
variety of constitutional restrictions on their authority and functions.'
The Montana constitutions of 1884 and 1889 were drafted while this
distrust was in full flood, and the heritage of that distrust still determines the structure and authority of the Montana Legislative Assembly
nearly a century after its creation, in a society that has been radically
transformed in basic ways-how we make our living, what we expect in
life, and what we think government should do about such matters. Few
would dispute these teachings of our political history.
But the lessons to be drawn from this history are far from axiomatic,
and provide a substantial portion of the agenda for modern state constitutional debate. Can the state legislature remain, or become again, a
productive and functionally effective branch of state government? What
are appropriate functions for a modern state legislature? Should state
constitutions restore the 18th century plenitude of legislative authority,
or continue to speak the distrust of the 19th century, or seek some different modern balance between the two? Is there enough meaningful

*A.B., Ohio State University; M.A., Ph.D., University of Wisconsin; Law
and Political Science Fellow, Harvard Law School (1963-1964); Member
of the 1971 Montana Constitutional Convention Commission; Professor of
Political Science, University of Montana.
**Author's note: Opinions expressed in this article in no way reflect views
or positions of the Montana Constitutional Convention Commission on
which I served as a gubernatorial appointee. I accept full personal responsibility for the opinions expressed in the article, as for any errors
of fact or judgment. The Constitutional Convention Commission was required by a convention enabling act "to undertake studies and research;
[and] to compile, prepare and assemble essential information for the
delegates, without any recommendation." This article was prepared prior
to, and independently of, the author's involvement as a commission member with materials prepared by the commission relating to the legislative
assembly.
1J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950) is one of the best brief treatments,
by a lawyer-historian. H. SECRIST, AN EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTIONS UPON PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES, (Bulletin No. 637
of the University of Wisconsin 1914), details the development of the constitutional
restrictions, in relation to economic developments. L. HARTZ, EcoNoMIC POLICY AND
DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948), is particularly suggestive
for implications of the shift from state to private enterprise after 1837.
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governing still to be done by the states to make these questions significant ?
Adequate answers to any of these questions is beyond the scope
and purpose of this article, but the author should declare the points
of view that inform what will be said about a modern constitutional
framework for the Montana Legislative Assembly. As a student and
professional observer of three state legislatures over a period of more
than three decades, and more particularly of the Montana Legislative
Assembly for nearly 20 years, I believe that a vital representative assembly is an indispensable element of modern state government, to
perform at least three basic functions (not necessarily stated in order of
importance) :
1) To review and pass judgment on proposals of law that help
to determine whatever public policies the state still may manage in an
increasingly nationalized economic, social and political system.
2) To regulate the level and intensity of state governmental activity by controlling modes and levels of taxation and public expenditure.
3) To check the exercise of authority by the other branches of
state government, most particularly by the executive and bureaucracy
whose dominant role distinguishes government in our time.
I believe the Montana Legislative Assembly is seriously disabled
from effective performance of any of these functions by its 19th century
constitutional foundations. I believe the quality and capacities of most
who seek and hold legislative office in Montana are distinctly superior
to the equipment we ask them to operate, and that tragically, many
of the ablest simply abandon or refuse to seek legislative service out of
the frustrations this archaic apparatus engenders. A stronger, integrated
executive authority is imperative if state governments do not default
proper local responsibility and control to a lumbering national bureaucratic leviathan; and a stronger, freer legislature is necessary if for no
other reason than to check this augmented executive authority. I believe,
further, that substantial areas of sparse and declining population in
Montana require the ministrations of an effective state government
because local government will be simply too feeble to maintain what
traditionally have been regarded as local functions. 2 Police, administration of justice, health, education, welfare, land use and environmental
controls are, in my judgment, obvious examples of public concerns for
which more, rather than less, state government is indicated in Montana.
For such concerns a revitalized representative assembly is indispensable.
lAs this material went to press, a Missouri Basin Interagency Committee study of
population movements in the ten-state region reported that remaining rural population
in some areas "is too small to support many of the institutions necessary to fulfill
their needs" and suggested policies to reverse the movement of people to the cities.
Yet that movement was expected to continue "for the next 50 years", Missoulian,
Sept. 22, 1971 (AP news story from Kansas City). Might it not be more realistic
to adjust the political institutions to the projected population trends?
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What should a new Montana constitution say about the legislative branch of state government? Even the casual student of state, constitutions recognizes that emulation is the first rule of constitutionwriting; most state constitutions reflect trends of thought and experience
in other states at, or somewhat before, the time of drafting. This really
means that many considerations of government and public policy are
regional or national and that emulation simply expresses a common
reaction to these matters. So I will attempt some systematic comparisons with what are rather arbitrarily called "the modern state constitutions" - some products of systematic general revision efforts since
about 1960, whether they were ratified or not.3
By the time this article appears the Montana Constitutional Convention Commission will have published four significant general surveys
of constitutional provisions relating to the legislature; for me to undertake a fifth such survey with limited personal resources of time. and
4
energy would be pointless.
This article addresses a limited number of matters that have central
and distinctive importance for the Montana legislature, matters that
predictably will be given substantial attention in the forthcoming constitutional convention. After an introductory discussion of the problem
of granting legislative authority in a state constitution, several matters
of legislative structure are considered: the size and number of houses,
3

Particular reference is made to the following constitutions (date is year of ratification, or for rejected constitutions, year draft was completed): Alaska (1956);
Arkansas (1970); Connecticut (1965); Florida (1968); Hawaii (1968); Illinois
(1970); Michigan (1963); Virginia (1970); Idaho (1970 Const. Draft); Maryland
(1968 Const. Draft); New Mexico (1969 Const. Draft); New York (1967 Const.
Draft); Rhode Island (1968 Const. Draft)-; and NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,

(6th edition 1963) (hereinafter N.M.L.).

MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION

'The Commission publications are:
a) A "Comparison of the Montana Constitution with the Constitutions of [Six]
Selected Other States" prepared by the Montana Legislative Council staff in 1967
as working papers for a Council study of the constitution. This is reissued as MoxTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OCCASIONAL PAPERS, REPORT NUMBER 5.

b) A 1968 "Legislative
MONTANA

Council Report on the Montana Constitution"

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

OCCASIONAL

PAPERS, REPORT

reissued as

NUMBER 6.

A small Council subcommittee made several section-by-section "trips"
through the
Montana Constitution during the winter 1967-1968, and concluded that "less than
one-half of the document is considered adequate in its present form." LETTER o
The
TRANSMITTAL by Senator David F. James, Chairman of the Council (1968).
Council endorsed its subcommittee findings.
c) "Constitutional Provisions Proposed by Constitution Revision Commission Sub
committees (December, 1968)" first published as MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CdNVENTION

OCCASIONAL PAPERS,

REPORT NUMBER

7.

Generally I concur in the recommendations of the 1968 Legislative Council Report
and of the 1969 Revision Commission subcommittees. They thought a number of
current provisions for legislative organization and function were adequate or could
easily be made adequate, but that numerous other current provisions should be deleted to leave the matters for statutory regulation.
d)The MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDIES, REPORT NUMBER 12, "The
Legislature," scheduled for publication in November, 1971; it cannot be accompanied
by Commission recommendations.
-STATE

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS

AFFECTING

LEGISLATURES

(May,

1967),

is' a

Research Report of the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures that makes systematic analysis of then-current provisions of the 50 state constitutions.
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and districting and apportionment. One set of problems of function is
examined: the frequency and length of sessions and the related question
of compensation.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARENA OF STATE
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
Events and political discourse of the late 18th century, attested
by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 5 established
the proposition that the people of a state could authorize their state
government to do anything not prohibited by the national constitution.
This large and unspecified reservoir of state power was further limited
in practice, of course, by restrictions the people of each state had decided
to impose on their state and local governments expressed in their state
constitution. The tradition of written documents describing the grant
and limitation of governmental powers emerged in full flower in the
few momentous years between 1776 and 1787.
Thus, the authority of a state legislature, recently stated with uncommon precision by the 1968 Hawaii Constitution "shall extend to all
rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with this (state) constitution or the Constitution of the United States."'6 This is more illuminating than the common provision of state constitutions that simply
7
vests "the legislative power of the state" in some sort of legislature.
A state legislature may legislate on any subject not prohibited, in any
manner not prohibited.
As the state constitution provides the framework for basic instrumentalities of government, it must also in a truly constitutional regime
limit the otherwise plenary authority of a state legislature over some
subjects of legislation not precluded from state competence by the
national constitution. A century ago in the massive treatise that quickly
became the "Blackstone" of American state constitutional law, Thomas
M. Cooley expressed the matter this way: "The (state) legislative department is not made a special agency for the exercise of specifically
defined legislative powers, but is entrusted with the general authority
to make laws at discretion"." Cooley endorsed a statement by Chief
Justice Denio of the New York Court of Appeals:
CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively,
or to the people."
Ratified 1791.
HIAwAiI CONST. art. III, § 1. Legislative authority over a "wrongful" subject would
seem anomalous; perhaps inclusion of the word "rightful"
reassured lawyers that
judicial review would still be avaliable for clients disadvantaged by any novel or
marginal exercise of legislative authority.
7
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 1; Ida. (1970 Const. Draft) art. XVIII, § 9 suggests a
possibly useful transitional statement: "Unrestricted nature of power of legislature.
No inference restricting the power of the legislature shall be drawn from the deletions
or omissions from this Constitution of any provisions of the Constitution of 1890
and its amendments. The power of the legislature shall be restricted only by this
Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.''
8
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION, 106 (5th edition, 1883).
5U:S.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/2

4

Waldron:
Modern Montana
MONTANA
LAW Constitution
REVIEW

[Vol. 33

Plenary power in the legislature, for all purposes of civil government, is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power is an
exception. In inquiring, therefore, whether a given statute is constitutional, it is for those who question its validity to show that it
is forbidden.'
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations summoned massive documentary
support from state court practice for those who sought to show how
state legislative authority was limited - not only by express constitutional terms, but by imaginative judicial application of the notion of
due process, and by judicial implication of such restrictions as the notion
that the only valid tax was one levied for a "public purpose."'1
So almost everything expressed in a state constitution, along with
some things implied from its wordage, limits or restricts the exercise of
state legislative authority." From a legislative perspective, one of the
prime purposes of a general constitutional review is to apply contemporary tests to the accumulated verbiage of the state charter, in order
to retain only those restrictions of legislative authority that currently
make sense, and perhaps to add a few new ones voicing current preoccupations with abuse of power. We might invert Chief Justice Denio's
principle of constitutional draftsmanship: In inquiring,therefore, whether
a given constitutional provision is required, it is for those who support its
validity to show that its inclusion is necessary.
This perspective will inform our review of the legislative articles
in the Montana Constitution and in more than a dozen modern state
charters. Our problem would be simpler, and even the best of modern
state constitutions would be briefer and tidier, if our principle was sufficient in practice. In fact, state constitutions also commonly direct
governmental agencies and officers affirmatively to do certain things.
Such affirmative performance requirements may be desirable; certainly
they seem to be unavoidable, however clumsy are the modes to compel
performance by reluctant officials. Occasionally such affirmative constitutional performance requirements are simply ignored. For example,
the Montana Legislative Assembly never has conducted the state census
midway between decennial federal censuses that was required by Article
VI, section 2 of the 1889 Constitution. Such a census in 1895 "and
every tenth year thereafter" was to furnish the basis for legislative
apportionments midway between federal censuses, as well as after the
decennial census.

9
People v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532, 543 (1857).
1B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1942 reissued 1962) explores Cooley's
remarkable influence; he popularized the public purpose doctrine of taxation as an
implied constitutional limitation and it became a part of the constitutional law of
virtually every state although explicit constitutional statement of the proposition
appeared in only sixteen state constitutions including MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 11;
see Waldron, The Public Purpose Doctrine of Taxation, 14 SummAREs or DOCTORAL

DISSERTATIONS 242, (University of Wisconsin, 1954).
nHURST, supra note 1 at 230: "The more constitutions went into detail, the more

they limited the power of the legislatures and increased that of the judges."
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CONSTITUTING THE LEGISLATURE
SIZE OF CHAMBER

Five modern state constitutions specify the precise number of members to be elected to each legislative chamber, but three others prescribe
the reapportionment process will
a range of size within which statute or 12
determine the precise number of seats.
Constitutional statement of an acceptable range of
preferable to a precise number because it gives the
apportioning process some flexibility to seek out an
population ratios to existing populations of local units
boundaries of election districts.

size is probably
districting and
optimum fit of
and to existing

Certainly a maximum size should be stated, particularly where
multi-member districting is acceptable, because of the tendency of reapportioning agencies to13resolve districting and apportionment problems
by creating more seats.
For single-member districting the imperatives may run the other
way, since narrower percentages of variance can be more easily achieved
with fewer and larger districts which disturb fewer established election
district boundaries. Thus a constitutional lower limit of membership
size would be desirable if there is any disposition to employ singlemember districting.
How large should Montana's legislative chambers be?
Legislatures, both American and foreign, come in all sizes with no
clear relationship of size to populations represented. The ideal size
must be found in the eye of the viewer, not in any objective test. Most
viewers would probably agree that the New Hampshire House of 400
" Fixed size: ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 1: 20 senate, 40 house; ARK. CONST. art. III,
§ 1, 34 senate, 102 house; HAWAI CONST. art. III, § 2, 3: 25 senate, 51 house; ILL.
CONST. art. IV, § 1: 59 senate, 177 house; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 2, 3: 38 senate,
110 house; N.Y. (1967 Const. Draft) art. III, § 1(a): 60 senate, 150 house; R. I.
(1968 Const. Draft) art. IV, § 3, 4: 40 senate, 100 house.
Range of size: CONN. CONST. art. III, § 3. 4: 30-50 senate, 125-225 house; FLA.
CONST. art. III, § 1, 16: 30-40 senate, 80-100 house; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 2, 3:
33-40 senate, 90-100 house; Ida. (1970 Const. Draft) art. III, § 3: statute, house
not more than twice the size of senate; Md. (1968 Const. Draft) art. III, § 3.03:
maximum: 40 senate, 120 house; N.M. (1969 Const. Draft) art III, § 2: maximum:
42 senate, 70 house; N.M.L. MODEL CONST. (1963) art. IV, § 4.02: constitution to
fix range with senate not more than one-third the size of house.
"3Thus the U.S. House of Representatives grew to 435 members before it mustered
determination to make this the maximum size. Montana's legislative chambers increased from an initial senate of 16 and house of 50, to a senate of 66 (because of
"county-busting"), and a house of 102, before the 1951 legislature cut the house
size back to 90; it crept up to 94 after the 1950 and 1960 censuses, but the federal
court increased the size to 104 in 1965, evidently because it was convenient to apportion representatives to districts initially designed for 55 senators. It may be questioned whether a federal court would assume responsibility, absent some state constitutional or statutory standard, to make any material reduction in the existing size
of a legislative chamber; one-man, one-vote requirements can always be met more
easily by increasing the size of multi-member districts and by assigning more representatives to such districts.
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Representatives, and the Massachusetts (240), Pennsylvania (203) and
Georgia (195) lower houses, along with the U.S. House of Representatives
(435) are too large for effective deliberative activity.
The average state house of representatives would have 115 members, and an average-sized senate would have 40 members. But such
averages mean nothing when 40 senators represent 20 million Californians while Montana has 55 senators to represent less than 700,000
population and New Hampshire has 400 representatives for about the
same number of people as Montana.
Each California senator represents about seven-tenths as many
people as the entire population of Montana. Only Georgia (56), Illinois
(58), Iowa (61), Minnesota (67) and New York (57) have larger
senates than Montana. Twenty senators are enough in Alaska and Nevada, 28 in Utah, 30 in Arizona, Oregon and Wyoming, 31 in Texas,
35 in Colorado and South Dakota, and 49 for the entire Nebraska unicameral Legislature. Twenty-three states have larger houses of representatives than Montana's 100 members.
The most meaningful comparison would be in terms of constituent
population per legislator. Only in the senate and house of Alaska and
Wyoming, and the New Hampshire house, do American state legislators represent fewer constitutents than in Montana. It says something, of course, that these are states like Montana with relatively
small populations.
If the Montana constitutional convention were to adopt the national average of constituents per legislator, Montana would have a
senate of eight and a house of twenty members. 14 Of course some of
these would be elected from districts rather larger than a good many
states, and there would be some problems in filling standing committees.
But such a legislature would probably find the space allocated for
legislative operation in the aging capitol to be sufficient.
What this fantasy illustrates, of course, is that an adequate legislative institution is achieved only by balancing many considerations.
It does seem reasonable to suggest that the principles and goals of
representative government would not be forfeit in a unicameral Mon15
tana legislature of 50 to 75 members.
The argument of persons in areas of declining population that
they "lose" representation by reapportionment is understandable if not
persuasive; their town or county that used to elect a senator and a
"4 All figures are derived from 1970-1971 BOOK OF THE STATES, 65, 82-83, or computed
from that source. There would be one senator per 86,260 constituents and one representative per 34,306 constituents as the national average; voters per seat for Vermont,
Hawaii and Massachusetts were doubled to approximate total populations.
5
1 The 1966 Montana-Idaho Assembly on State Legislatures thought the size of the
Montana legislature was "approximately correct'' but in 1968 the Montana Citizens
Committee on the State Legislature proposed reduction in size of the chambers.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1972

7

1971]

Montana
Law Review, Vol.ASSEMBLY
33 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 2
THE
LEGISLATIVE

representative may no longer do so, particularly if their county is
associated with a more populous county in a several-county district
that elects several legislators at large. But the argument that local
interests are thereby sacrificed is not quite so obvious. There probably
is greater diversity of occupation, way of life and political attitudes
among any thousand dwellers in a few blocks of a major Montana city
than among an equal number comprising the entire population of some
smaller counties. In this sense the plea that increase in the size of legislative constituencies deprives local interests of representation seems no
more valid for an essentially homogeneous sweep of prairie or river
valley than for a portion of an urban center.
Two HOUSES--OR ONE?

This is one of the fundamental decisions to be made by a constitutional convention, or by the people, regarding the legislature.
The matter undoubtedly will be explored by the Montana constitutional
convention, perhaps with unusual vigor after the deadlock of recent
years over basic state tax policy. At the very least, I hope the delegates
will submit the bicameral-unicameral option to the voters at ratification.
I have come to favor a unicameral legislature for Montana.
Several of the first state legislatures were unicameral, but the
pattern of a two-house legislature was universal among the states by
1837.16 Nearly a century later, Nebraska adopted a unicameral structure in 1934, but no other state followed that lead. Discussion of the
issue waned until the one-man, one-vote decisions of 1964 eliminated
the possibility that one chamber might represent territorial divisions
without regard to their population. Montana's traditional one-senatorper-county system, justified by the "little federal" analogy, was terminated by a federal court decision in 1965.17
Although most of the world's legislatures have two chambers,
balanced or "true" bicameralism that gives substantial equality of
powers to each chamber seems to be a distinctive feature of the American national and state legislatures. By contrast the less popularly
constituted "upper" chambers of British and Commonwealth parliaments have functions distinctly subordinate to the first, or lower
uB. ZELLER, AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES, 49 (1954).

See also ch. 4 for a brief
and balanced consideration of the cameralism issue in the American states. K. WHEAR.,
LEGISLATURES (2d ed. 1967). Ch. 8, Two Chambers-More or Less? considers European experience.
"THerweg v. 39th Montana Legislative Assembly, 246 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mont. 1965).
The 'little federal" analogy was always a shaky justification because counties, with
respect to states, do not occupy the position that states hold in relation to the national government. The courts have accepted the proposition that the U.S. Senate
is not subject to the one-man, one-vote rule because equal representation of states
in the Senate was a cornerstone of the "Great Compromise" that made achievement
of a federal system possible in the first place. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574
(1964). Nearly all the modern reapportionment arguments were expressed at length in
the 1889 Montana Constitutional Convention. See, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES Or THE
1889 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 623, 624, 631 (1921).
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chamber. In the parliamentary or "cabinet" form of government, the
popularly elected lower chamber creates the executive from its own
leadership, and that executive continues to function only so long as it
maintains its "parliamentary majority." Does balanced bicameralism
persist as a kind of luxury in American legislatures because our executive is independently constituted? An independent executive in at
least nominal control of the bureaucracy can get on with governing in
some fashion despite opposition in one or both chambers of the legislature, so long as public funds are appropriated.1 8
One may also ask whether the steady growth of executive and
bureaucratic authority during the past century, while universal and
probably inevitable, may have been disproportionate in the United
States where balanced bicameralism has sustained the opportunity for
deadlock and delay in the legislature?
Still further, has this built-in capacity and tolerance for deadlock
and delay contributed to the inadequate response of state governments
to pressing problems of the American society in the past generationcontributing to the universally acknowledged shift of significant authority and function to the national government? My sense that the answer
in each case should be a qualified affirmative contributes to the belief
that the Montana constitutional convention should seriously consider
adoption of a unicameral legislature. There are also some immediate,
local and demonstrable reasons for such consideration.
A sterile quality has permeated modern American debate over
cameralism. In the first place, it has pitted the real and the experienced
against the hypothetical and unproven, because the solitary unicameral
example has had limited "transfer value." It has always been possible
to argue that the Nebraska experience is irrelevant because of nonpartisan election (Minnesota is the only other state to elect its legislators on nonpartisan ballot) in a state so dominated by one party
that the example has no validity for states like Montana with a vigorous tradition of party competition. Moreover, much of the defense of
bicameralism has been expressed in terms so irrelevant to the real
basis for its continued support that some proponents seem either to
lack understanding or candor, or both, about what goes on in a state
legislature.
I will note some of the conventional arguments, with very brief
comment, and get on to two or three points that seem to have real
substance for the Montana legislature. 19

uWheare, supra note 16 at 137, indicates that balanced bicameralism also exists in
Switzerland where the executive holds office for a fixed term.
"The propositions are summarized from Zeller, supra note 16. See also W. KEEFE AND
M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS,

53, 55 (1964).
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For two houses it is argued:
1. The delays and duplication of process prevent hasty, ill-considered
legislation. Query: In a short session legislature like that of Montana,
do not the delays of doing everything twice promote, rather than discourage, ill-considered legislation? If the argument is persuasive why
do many of its proponents also urge retention of a 60-day session limit?
2. There is a built-in check against popular passions and impulses.
Perhaps. Query: If legislators are representative, should they not
respond to popular impulses? And do they not do so on occasion, in
bicameral legislatures? Where there is a will and absence of opposition, legislation occasionally breezes through the Montana bicameral
legislature in two or three days.
3. A unicameral body might be too powerful vis-a-vis other branches
of government, or the people. Perhaps. But earlier unicameral legislatures were not monsters, apparently, nor has the Nebraska legislature
proven to be one. Query: Is a bicameral legislature too feeble, when
stalemated by partisan or other divisions, to maintain adequate check
against other branches?
4. Two houses are indigenous and traditional. So were legislative
election of United States senators, male suffrage, and the 21-year-old
threshold to the "political country." One of the essences of a constitutional convention is the unaccustomed burden of proof it thrusts upon
the traditional, to revalidate continued observance.
5. Two chambers give better protection against special interest or
lobby domination of the legislature. It will be argued below, and at
length, that however true this may have been in the 19th century, bicameralism works precisely in the other direction today.
For one chamber it is argued:
1. It gives legislative service more prestige, attracts better-qualified
candidates, and encourages development of leadership. Perhaps, but none
of these points is susceptible to the kind of proof that would persuade
the unconvinced.
2. It :operates more efficiently to give thorough consideration of
legislation. This apparently has occurred in Nebraska :20 to the extent
that processes would be stretched out and given more' time, the point
seems reasonable. The same could occur, of course, in a bicameral legislature given more time to do its work.
3.

Rivalry and deadlock between chambers is eliminated. Obviously.

4. Responsibility is more.' clearly fixed. Equally obvious, s i n c e

"Keefe and Ogul, supra note 19 at 55, n. 53.
Legislature, 5 WEST POL. Q. 504-512 (1952).
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neither house, or its leaders, can blame the rascals in the other chamber,
or the bicameral system, for their difficulties.
5. Collaboration with the executive is facilitated. Of course. But
how much value is to be placed on this collaboration?
6. It is less costly in various ways. It might be, if limited in membership to something like half the present total membership. This kind
of dollar-of-direct-output argument, while persuasive to some, probably
is less important than the question whether the impact on state government generally would be more or less desirable.
7. The legislative process is more open, more deliberate, more capable of being understood by people outside, and therefore less subject
to special interest dominance. These are substantial considerations, discussed at greater length below.
CAMERALISM AND PARTY COMPETITION

IN

MONTANA

A constitutional convention is the appropriate forum to review
the basic structural pattern of one or two legislative chambers, and
consideration of the question in Montana should not be clouded by
inappropriate comparisons to Nebraska experience. The unicameral
Nebraska legislature of 49 members elected for four-year terms has
apparently fulfilled, with at least moderate success, some of the claims
of economy, efficiency, representativeness and adequate deliberation
that were made for it. But the Nebraska legislature has always been
elected on a nonpartisan ballot, in a state so republican that it has nar2
rowly escaped classification as a one-party state. '
By sharpest contrast Montana state politics has been stubbornly,
persistently competitive over 80 years-perhaps more evenly balanced
in bipartisanship than any other state.22 Montana's first legislative
assembly never met because there was no party majority to organize

I'D. LocKARD, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOvERNMENT,

185 (1963).

In

this

classification, based on voting for president and governor 1944-1960, Nebraska was
the least competitive among a group of seven states classified as ''less competitive,
Republican dominant."

Since 1941 a Democrat has been governor of Nebraska for

only eight years; all of Nebraska's U.S. senators have been Republican; and the
last 14 congressional elections have sent 45 Republicans and only four Democrats to
the U. S. House of Representatives from Nebraska.
R. SCAMmON, AMERICA AT THE POLLS (1965), for presidential elections, 1920-1964;
R. SCAMMON, AMERICA VOTES (1956); and CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORIES.
M. JEWELL AND S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES,

141-146 (1966) compare and classify 48 states according to party competition in their
state legislatures but Nebraska and Minnesota are excluded for the obvious reason
that their legislative elections are nonpartisan.
" 'As Main goes . . ." is an outmoded adage, perhaps valid for an earlier time. Only
Idaho, narrowly, has picked the winner in presidential elections more consistently than
Montana in this century. Montana favored Bryan in his free silver campaign of 1900
(by only 1,773 more votes than for McKinley), but then favored the winner every
time except 1960 when Nixon carried the state by 6,950 more votes than Kennedy
in a notably close national election. See also, Jewell and Patterson, supra note 21 at
144.
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25

it, and the deadlock extended into the second session until it was resolved by an ad hoc compromise.2 3 Counting these first two sessions,
party control has been divided between, or within, the chambers in
19 of 42 sessions, including the seven most recent sessions.
PARTY CONTROL, MONTANA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
AND GOVERNOR, 1889-1971
House
Sess. Senate
Gov.
House
Sess. Senate
1889
1891
1893

=

D
D

-

1897

R

-

1899

D

R

1895
1903

D

1905

--

1939

D

D

D

1941

R

1943

R

R

R

D

1945

R

R

R

R

R

D
--

1907
1909

R
R

R
D

--

1911
1913
1915
1917

R
D
R3
R

D
D
D
D

-

1919
1921

R
R

R
R

-

1923
1925

R
R

R
R

1927

R

R

1929

R.

R

--

D

D

--

R
-

-

D

D3

R
--

D

D

R
R
D3

D3
--

-

Gov.

1931
1933
1935

R

D

1901

R
D
D

D
D
R

?

-

--

.

1937

-

D

D

D

D
-

D

1947

R

D
D

1949
1951

R
R

D
D
D
D

1953
1955
1957
1959

R
R
D
D

D
R

1961
1963

D
D

--

R
D

1965
1967

D
D

--

D

1969

D

1971

--

D

R
R

R

R

D
R

D
D--

R
D
D
D

-

D
R

--

R
R

R
R

--

R

R
R

--

D

R

D

R

--

--

R

--

R

R
D

D

1889: senate evenly divided, no house majority w/o contested
seats, no session
-

3

party competition

majority by 3d party support

Of even greater impact is the fact that during 10 of 23 sessions in
which the same party controlled both chambers, the governor was of a
different party from the legislative majorities. The Montana governor
has faced an opposition majority in at least one legislative chamber
during 12 of the last 16 sessions, and during 30 of the 42 sessions. In
only 11 of 42 sessions-most recently in 1953-has nominal party
harmony existed among the governor and leadership of both legislative
chambers (sessions of 1895, 1899, 1901, 1913, 1921, 1923, 1937, 1943,
1945, 1947, 1953).
In Montana since 1889, party control has been divided as between
the governor and at least one chamber of the legislature 71 percent of
the time.
To summarize: the persistence and sweep and close balance of
party rivalry in Montana state politics constitutes a factor justifying
review of bicameralism in the state legislature. I think that party
competition in the Montana pattern is healthy and desirable, but
believe that its implications need to be recognized today as they could
not have been anticipated in 1889. We possess mobility of movement,
freedom to organize interests, and media to communicate them beyond
1T. STOUT, I MONTANA, ITS STORY AND BIoORAPHY,
TANA, THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE,

367-369 (1930).
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the wildest imaginings of the 19th century. My argument is that we
have enough checks against abuse of power without bicameralism in
the legislature, and too many checks with it. The delay and obstruction
involved by bicameralism in Montana is excessive and constitutes a
prime reason for consideration and adoption of a unicameral legislature.
BICAMERALISM AND CONTROL OF "SPECIAL

INTERESTS"

"We're really here, you know, to prevent the passage of bad legislation," a thoughtful senator once explained to me after an unproductive
morning session. Since state legislators rarely originate bills they introduce, and pass less than half of the measures they consider, this was a
pungent if unconventional description of the legislative process. "Bad"
or "junk" bills are, of course, those introduced for the benefit of the
other fellow. "Our little bill" is always vital and so obviously sensible
that only an ignoramus would oppose it.
The argument comes down to us from the 19th century that the
acknowledged delays of process and the not-so-obvious superiority of
deliberation in a bicameral legislature make it more difficult for "special" interests to prevail. In the 19th century much legislation was in
fact "special" or "private" in nature. Prior to the adoption of general
incorporation statutes during the middle third of the century, private
corporations came to supplant state and local governments in the
development of most internal improvements; their essentially monopolistic character created special problems and great pressures for legislatures trying to regulate them. General incorporation statutes and
specialized regulatory bodies gradually emerged to manage these central
problems of the economy, but not before legislatures had acquired a
reputation for corruption, and state constitutions had been laden. with
long lists of prohibitions against all kinds of special and private legis.
24
lation.
A distinguished lawyer-historian summarizes the problem;
In the nineteenth century many important interests were mainly
concerned with getting positive action out of the legislature-special
corporate charters, for example. By the twentieth, the emphasis had
changed for many of these interests, from getting to retaining their
gains unimpaired. They were thus now more interested in minimizing than in promoting legislative activity. Senator Norris drove
through the change in Nebraska to the one-house legislature mainly
with the. argument that the two-chamber, form gave too much

chance for obstruction of measures that were in the general
interest."
My observation of three state legislatures accords with this historical observation. In modern circumstances, bicameralism in the state
legislature gives too much advantage to those interests that are sub"MONT. CONST. art. V, § 26 and scattered provisions relating to railroads and other
common carriers, as in art. XIV, is quite typical. See Secrist, supra note 1, and any
collection of state constitutions.
gHurst, supra note 1 at 55.
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stantially vested after a century of state government. The unprecedented
changes that have occurred during the past half-century, including the
accelerated rate of change we experience in our institutions, requires
innovative public policies just to keep up with the conditions of our
existence. 26 Inflexible government and political arrangements resisting
fundamental changes in the way people live creates a widening gap
between expectations and performance that invariably presages revolutionary and uncontrolled change.
Stated another way, nearly all the advantages in the present state
legislature now lie with those whose politics is essentially status quo, protective of what they have, calling mostly for defeat of any change.
Bicameralism more than doubles the nooks and crannies of process in
which to bushwhack anything that might jeopardize an entrenched
position. David Truman has noted the advantage "defensive groups"
found in bicameralism:
The bicameral organization of our typical legislature and the
constitutional separation of powers operate, as they were designed,
to delay or obstruct action rather than to facilitate it

....

The dif-

fuseness of leadership, and the power and independence of committees and their chairmen, not only provide a multiplicity of

points of access . . . but also furnish abundant opportunities for
obstruction and delay, opportunities that buttress the position of
defensive groups.'

It is not argued here, nor by the authorities cited, that it should
simply be easier to pass bills, or that more of them should be passed,
or that the activities of interest groups are in themselves improper.
They are indispensable to the legislative process in a system where political parties seldom assume responsibility for formulation of public policy.
It is suggested that a soundly elected modern state legislature,
given adequate time, facilities and resources, and buttressed by the unprecedented modern capacities to know what is happening, and to mobilize to influence it, could be safely and more adequately responsive
to contemporary needs if unicameral than bicameral.
No adverse moral and political judgment is implied in the observation that most incumbent legislators and practicing lobbyists I know
seem to favor perpetuation of a bicameral legislature. They may be
expected to approve arrangements with which they are familiar, particularly if the complexities of these arrangements maximize the need
for their particular kind of "know how". This does not foreclose independent judgment by citizens and less-committed observers of the
process, that it is unduly complicated. A significant proportion of
former Montana legislators who voluntarily quit the service recently
2A. TO"LER, FuTuRz SHOCK (1970), discusses the phenomenon in terms of ''accelerative thrust" and increasing "transience"
as characteristics of contemporary life
in a technological society.

21D.

TRUMAN, THE GOvERNMENTAL PROCESS, 354 (1951). His chapters 11 and 12 on
The Dynamics of Access and Techniques of Interest Groups in the legislative process
are crisp, scholarly discussions by a leading student of interest group politics.
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voiced frustration with the complexities they experienced and 20 percent of them volunteered the idea that the legislature should be uni28
cameral.
DISTRICTING AND APPORTIONMENT

29

Provisions regulating districting and apportionment for legislative
elections have prominent place in state constitutions, either as part of
the legislative article or in a special article or schedule. The constitution of a new state commonly contains statutory detail to get the first
legislature elected, 30 but such provisions usually become obsolete after
the first succeeding decennial census. Modern practice might place
such detail in a transitional ordinance or schedule, but provisions for
recurrent districting and apportionment process are vital elements to be
considered in a contemporary state constitutional revision.
The reapportionment revolution of the 1960's occurred when federal
courts abandoned their traditional reticence 3 ' to intervene in state districting and apportionment for congressional and legislative elections
and subjected the process to equal protection requirements of the
32
Fourteenth Amendment.
The consequence for state constitutions was sudden obsolescence
of historic provisions found to conflict with one-man, one-vote standards
enunciated by federal courts.83 Efforts to devise new machinery for
"Unpublished research of Mrs. Jean Ellison, spring 1971, for a legislative process
seminar, University of Montana. A systematic effort was made to contact every
Montana legislator serving one or more sessions since 1950, who had voluntarily
abandoned legislative service (did not seek reelection). Each was asked: "What
do you consider to be the greatest weakness of the legislative process as it exists in
Montanal" and "Have you any suggestions that you believe would make the legislature more efficient, more effective, and more responsive?'
t
Reapportionment, as a term, commonly describes a process that has two distinguishable steps: districting establishes the number and boundaries of election districts
within which legislators are elected; apportionment establishes the number of legislators to be elected from each district; more accurately, the total number of legislators is apportioned among the districts. For single-member districts the two stages
become one: districts are created and one legislative seat is apportioned to each
district. Multi-member districts call for a distinction between the two steps: creation
of a number of districts, and then apportionment of one or more seats to each district.
The actual census population of each single-member district must be approximately
the same. For multi-member districts the fiction is honored that equal representation
exists when the district population divided by the district's apportionment of seats
equals the state population divided by the total number of seats to be apportioned:
State Population
District Population
Total number of seats
Number of District Seats
MMONT. CONST. art. VI, §§ 5, 6 (repealed 1965 Laws, e. 273, ratified Nov. 8, 1966).
UColegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), justiciability of state legislative apportionments;
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), equal protection in congressional district
apportionment, under U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2; Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 17 and
associated cases, commonly called Reapportionment Cases, extending equal protection
to elections for both houses of state legislatures.
'No state constitutional provision can take priority over a justiciable right derived
from the United States Constitution or laws, U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2. Thus MONT.
CON ST. art. V, § 4, was held unconstitutional, Herweg v. 39th Legislative Assembly,
246 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mont. 1965); 1965 Laws, c. 273, ratified Nov. 8, 1966, repealed
art. XI, §§ 4 and 45 due to incompatability with new reapportionment requirements.
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districting and apportionment that will meet Fourteenth Amendment
standards of equal protection are prominent features of state constitutions revised during the past decade. Of 14 recent constitutional drafts
here under examination, 12 introduce some agency other than the legislature either to initiate reapportionment plans, or to accomplish them
following legislative deadlock. This article will explore these innovations
and make a recommendation for Montana. First, however, it will be
helpful to summarize some constitutional benchmarks established during
the past decade, and seek to identify related matters that warrant
treatment in a modern state constitution.
National constitutional requirements now establish certain things
that must follow each census:
1) Reapportionment for congressional seats and state legislative
chambers must occur decennially after the census.
2) The standard to be observed in creating districts for election
to achieve precise matheof U.S. representatives is "a good faith effort
4
matical equality" among their populations.3
3) Each chamber of the state legislature must be elected by a
districting and apportionment system that achieves district 8' popula5
tions or apportionment ratios "as nearly equal as practicable.
4) The standard of equality must be a good-faith attempt to
achieve population equality rather than some predetermined maximum
percentage of variance. 30
5) But the United States Supreme Court has declined to specify
allowable percentage limits of population variance because much depends upon size of the districts and on other considerations that vary
87
from state to state.
6) More precise standards of allowable variance may emerge
from the litigation of reapportionments in the 1970's, but a current
"educated guess" is that variances for state legislatures are suspect

"Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531-532 (1968); justification must be given
for "limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort."
1Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 17 at 577.
"Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra note 34 at 531.
'"The wide variation in size of state legislative chambers, as between California's
senate of 40 and New Hampshire 's house of 400 was noted, supra note 14 and accompanying text. A variation of 1,000 population between two California senate districts
would be 1/20 of one percent plus or minus; between two Montana house districts,
about 14.5 percent plus or minus; and between two New Hampshire house districts,
about 56 percent plus or minus. For example: shifting one precinct or census enumeration district of 350 population in Montana would involve a shift of 1/10 of one
percent, plus or minus, for each district; but a shift of the same population between
two legislative districts of 7,000 population would involve a percentage shift of five
percent plus or minus for each such district.
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if greater than five to ten percent. 85 With such variances the apportioning agency must be able to show "good faith effort" to achieve equality
in order to justify variances of that magnitude. Rejection of an apportionment with narrower margins of variance to adopt one with wider
variances casts a shadow on the good faith of the apportioning agency.39
7) Primary responsibility for equitable districting and apportionment lies with state legislatures and/or state apportioning agencies.
8) But federal and state courts will accept and, upon satisfactory
proof, sustain citizen actions to enjoin inequitable apportionments. Usually the court finding inequitable apportionment will refer the problem
back to the constituted state agency, often with guidelines or instructions, "retaining jurisdiction" until the matter is resolved to satisfaction
of plaintiff and court. Sometimes the court itself will "fashion relief"that is, impose its own plan of reapportionment as in Montana in
1965.40
As with racial segregation and the rights of the criminal defendant,
judicial application of Fourteenth Amendment standards to legislative
representation complicated but did not supplant state responsibilities.
The state still has very substantial discretion as to some of the standards
to govern legislative selection:
1) Should the state constitution attempt to declare such standards?
In what form?
2) From what kinds of districts should state legislators be elected?
The state still may choose between single-member or multi-member districts or certain combinations of the two kinds of districts.
3) The state still may determine the most appropriate reapportionment agency. Should this be the legislature, or an apportionment commission, or some combination of the two? How should a special apportionment agency be constituted?
4) Should the constitution specifically recognize and regulate the
exercise of judicial review in apportionment matters?
CONSTITUTIONAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

OF THE

APPLICABLE FEDERAL STANDARD

As indicated above, federal courts will apply the prevailing conception of equal protection of the laws to state reapportionments, whether
wBoYD,

REAPPORTIONrENT IN THE 1970s: THE PROBLEMS OF COMPLIANCE, 5 (an address
prepared for the National Legislative Conference and circulated by the Council of
State Governments January 1971): "If you play around with figures much bigger
than 5 percent, then inevitably you are in trouble."
9This is my reading of Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,supra note 34 at 529 in which a central
fact was a district court finding below "that the General Assembly had rejected a
redistricting plan submitted to it which provided for districts with smaller population
variances among them" than the one adopted and at issue in the case.
'Herweg v. 39th Montana Legislative Assembly, supra note 33; Roberts v. Babcock,
246 F. Supp. 396 (D. Mont. 1965).
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the state constitution acknowledges such jurisdiction or not. But one
of the functions of a state constitution is to enunciate fundamental legal
principles for the guidance of both governors and governed. Several
modern constitutions expressly acknowledge the federal standard, and
the language of the Florida provision is particularly concise and comprehensive; it directs the legislature to reapportion after each decennial
census "in accordance with the constitution of the state and of the United
States." The Connecticut Constitution directs that "The establishment
assembly shall be consistent with federal conof districts in the general
41
stitutional standards."
SINGLE-MEMBER

OR MULTI-MEMBER DISTRICTS?

The choice between single-member and multi-member elections to the
legislature is a fundamental legislative issue to be resolved by the
constitutional convention. The choice is commonly made in the constitution, although it need not be exclusively for one or the other. As in
Montana through most of its century-long political history, a combination of the two kinds of districts is not uncommon. But the relative
balance between them materially affects the nature of legislative representation.
Should the voter choose among two or three candidates for a single
seat and be represented by one winner? Or should the voter choose
among ten, or twenty, or forty candidates and be represented by the
fraction of them-five, or ten, or twenty-who get the most votes?
Should there be a one-to-one relationship between constituent and legislator, or group representation of sizeable populous districts?
Single-member representation of relatively small territorial districts
has long prevailed in both American and British legislative elections.
It probably still prevails in American state legislative elections despite
pressures to use multi-member districts as the easier way to achieve
equal protection of the franchise.
For a century, a preponderant majority of Montana territorial and
state legislators were elected from single-member districts, although
a few members were elected from multi-member districts of moderate
size in the larger cities. The situation was sharply reversed by the federal
district court that reapportioned the Montana Legislative Assembly to

"4 CONI. CONST. art. III, § 5. The N.Y. (1967 Const. Draft) art. III, § 2 (c) said
"the standards set forth in this section shall govern redistricting of congressional
districts to the extent that such standards are not inconsistent with standards established by the United States." But state legislative districting is also subject to
federal standards. The R.I. (1968 Const. Draft) art. IV, §§ 2 and 3 provided for
apportionment of the senate and house ''on the basis of population, consistent with
federal standards." This like the Connecticut provision omits reference to the fact
that congressional districting is subject to federal constitutional and statutory standards.
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one-man, one-vote standards in 1965.42 Members of the 1967 legislature,
having won election from the new districts, found them good and perpetuated them by statute. 43 By 1971 the Montana Legislative Assembly
was in full flight from the historic single-member district system and
enacted a reapportionment that would elect 40 of 50 senators, and all
100 representatives from multi-member districts. 44 They were not all
large districts, but the two largest cities would elect six senators and 12
representatives each from November ballots that would confront the
voters in those cities with lists of a dozen senate candidates and two
dozen representative candidates-or more. As this was written, a federal
district court had ruled that the new arrangement for house elections
would suffice to elect delegates to the constitutional convention in November, 1971, but still held under advisement whether to permit 1972
45
legislative elections under the system.
Nominations and elections to the constitutional convention appeared
likely to demonstrate some of the implications of large multi-member
districting with unusual clarity, since no incumbency or carry-over
factors would be involved in the delegate nominations and elections. 46
In the September 14, 1971 primary elections, candidates from dominant counties in multiple-county districts generally won more than
their share of places on the November ballot; conversely, candidates
from counties of small population in such multiple-county districts fared
relatively poorly. 47 The real test will come in November, of course, when
"Prior to 1965 all senators had been elected from single-member districts, one senator
per county; and in 1964 only 38 of 94 representatives were elected from multimember districts; the 1965 judicial reapportionment provided for election of 35
of 55 senators, and 93 of 104 representatives, from multi-member districts.
4
R.C.M. 1947, §§ 43-106.1, 43-106.2 and 43-107 (1967 Laws, c. 194 adopted the 1965
judicial reapportionment).
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 43-106.6, 43-106.7 (H.B. 40, 1971 2d Extra Session, ch. 8, signed
June 29, 1971).
'wWold v. Anderson, Civil No. 939 (D. Mont. July 26, 1971).
"The Montana Supreme Court held that the constitution prohibited legislators from
being delegates to the constitutional convention, Fortysecond Legislative Assembly v.
Lennon, ...... Mont ....... , 481 P.2d 330 (1971).
7
' Share of Nominations won by Candidates from Dominant Counties in Multiple-County
Districts, September 14, 1971 Delegate Election:
Dominant County
% Dist.
District
Seats
Name
Population % Filings % Nominated
1
2
Big Horn
73.1
62.5
75
2
2
Custer
91.5
85
100
3
4
Dawson
42.3
65
87.5
5
2
Blaine
48.2
33
0
6
2
Rosebud
44.6
50
75
7
2
Carbon
50.5
50
75
10
2
Fergus
94.9
100
100
11
6
Gallatin
74.3
73
83.5
12
6
Lewis & Clark
81.1
85
83.5
14
4
Hill
60.1
43
50
19
4
Deer Lodge
56.7
65
62.5
21
2
Beaverhead
61.9
44
50
23
4
Lincoln
64.2
57
50
Candidates from Carter, Fallon, Garfield, Prairie, Golden Valley and
Broadwater Counties were eliminated, and there were no candidates
from Wibaux, Stillwater, Petroleum and Granite Counties.
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the field of candidates will be cut by half or more than half in general
bipartisan elections.
Ironically, "one-man, one-vote" standards have been implemented
in Montana and some other states by increasing the "one-voter, manylegislators" relationship involved in multi-member districts. This has
resulted from an intersection of several factors:
1) Reapportionment gave substantially greater shares of representation to larger cities. Characteristically, the four largest Montana cities,
already represented in multi-member districts of moderate size, together
picked up 17 more senators and nine more representatives in 1965.
2) It is easier to assign additional seats to populous centers than to
divide those centers into smaller districts. It is easier to combine counties of small population than to divide some of them up, attaching portions to other counties. Arithmetic reinforces politics: it is easier to
create a smaller number of large multi-member districts than to achieve
a small population variance among each of many smaller single-member
districts. It is also easier politically among incumbent legislators who
have "made it" in sizeable multi-member districts-particularly when
they recognize a partisan advantage in perpetuating the basis for their
own pluralities or majorities. The existence of such county-wide pluralities for Republicans in Yellowstone County and for Democrats in Silver
Bow County are two fundamental facts of legislative politics and apportionment in Montana. In the 1971 Legislative Assembly, the chairman
of the House reapportionment committee, a Billings Republican, and the
vice-chairman of the senate reapportionment committee, a Butte Democrat, were among the most determined champions of multi-member districting.
3) Some state constitutions prohibited division of counties in legislative districting; reapportionments that divided counties bore the burden
of proof that such division was necessary to meet equal protection
standards. The Montana Constitution contained such a prohibition
against dividing counties and in 1965 the federal court, having found a
way by use of multi-member districts to meet then-prevailing lenient
apportionment standards, refused to divide counties. The provision was
repealed in 1966.48
There is some evidence that, like Montana, other states have turned
to use more large multi-member districts, particularly for the urban

"MONT. CoNsT. art VI, § 3; See Waldron, Montana's 1966 Legislative Apportionnent

Amendment, 4 MONT. Bus. Q. 2 (1966).
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centers, but the evidence is too conflicting to speak of a trend. In 1962,
on the eve of the reapportionment revolution, 84 percent of all state
senators and 54 percent of all state representatives were elected from
single-member districts. I lack comparable data for recent elections, but
in 1970, 87.9 percent of all senate election districts were single-member,
49
Several
and 76.4 percent of all house districts were single-member.
moved
have
Tennessee,
and
Oklahoma
Colorado,
Ohio,
states, including
Georgia
and
Texas
and
completely,
districting
multi-member
away from
have broken up some of the very large multi-member districts that re50
sulted from gains in representation by major urban centers.
The Montana Citizens Committee on the State Legislature, like the
national Citizens Conference on the State Legislatures, has favored
single-member districting across the board, because, in the language
of its recent summary report, single-member districting facilitates "clear
identification between legislators and their constituents, a direct tie
between each individual legislator and each individual district," and
greater diversity of membership through representation of minorities
that tend to get submerged by a dominant majority in a large multimember district.51
'52
sustaining multiEfforts to demonstrate that the legal "fiction
the Fourteenth
of
guarantees
protection
equal
member districting violates
General
Colorado
v.
Lucas
From
Amendment have not thus far succeeded.
has
Court
Supreme
the
Assembly in 1964 to Connor v. Johnson in 1971,
expressed doubts about the representativeness of large multi-member
districts, and regards the question as justiciable; but thus far no peti-

JEWELL, THE STATE LEGISLATURE, 21 (1969), citing DAVID AND EISENBERG, STATE
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTING, 20 (1962) for the 1962 figures. For 1970, see 1970-71 BooK
oF THE STATES 82-83; 26 of 50 senates and 17 of 49 houses were elected exclusively
from single-member districts; in 24 senates and 32 houses elected partially from
multi-member districts, a majority of districts were single-member. BURNS, THE
SOMETIME GoVERNMENTS, 82 (1971), grossly misstates the balance, apparently from
failure to recognize the substantial number of single-member districts in states that
also use the multi-member district; the error is curious since the Citizen Conference
on State Legislatures that sponsored the publication favors single-member districts.
5
Jewell, supra note 49 at 23.
"M.

-Burns, supra note 49 at 52-53, 135. The lowly rating (41st among the 50) given
the Montana Legislative Assembly in this national study apparently resulted in conand 46th for
siderable degree from a standing of 49th for "representativeness"
The Montana legislature received average ratings on three other
"independence".
scores-26th for functional effectiveness, 28th for accountability, and 31st for capacity
to inform itself about legislative needs. I have strong personal reservations about
any rating system that puts short-session biennial legislatures on the same scale with
virtual full-time operations in some populous states; if such comparisons make good
propaganda for legislative reform nationally, they can be singularly unhelpful in
addressing the problems of a particular legislature.
wDiscussed supra note 29.
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tioner has been able to demonstrate their essential incompatibility with
equal protection of the laws. 53
On June 3, 1971 a six-member per curiam majority of the U.S.
Supreme Court ordered a Mississippi federal district court to devise
single-member districts for Hinds County, where petitioners had objected
to electing five senators and 12 representatives at large and had demonstrated that single-member districting was feasible. The majority said:
"[W]hen district courts are forced to fashion apportionment plans,
single-member districts are preferable to large multi-member districts
'54
as a general matter.
What does it matter, whether a citizen is represented by one legislator or by a panel of legislators? When the real-world alternative is
between one and twelve (Cascade and Yellowstone Counties, 1971) in
the state house of representatives, the difference is apt to be real, although there may be little agreement about its nature or significance.
Debate about the relative values of the two systems is inconclusive
because the divergent values desired from representation remain unarticulated, while the real-world distributions of interests vary almost infinitely with the territorial size and population of particular districts
and with matters of prime concern-whether they are economic, recreational, ethnic, religious. . . . Hopefully, the constitutional convention
will look somewhat dispassionately at the alternatives, and critically
examine the system by which the delegates themselves were elected.

5In Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 731 (1964), Chief Justice
Warren for the majority remarked that a Denver voter for eight senators and 17
representatives found "[b]allots were long and cumbersome, and an intelligent
choice among candidates for seats in the legislature was made quite difficult. No
identifiable constituencies within the populous counties resulted, and the residents
of those areas had no single member of the Senate or House elected specifically to
represent them." But "[wJe do not intimate that apportionment schemes which
provide for the at-large election of a number of legislators from . . . any political
subdivision, are constitutionally defective."
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, ...... U.S ....... , 29 L. Ed.2d 363, 375 (1971) voters in a
Negro ghetto in Indianapolis failed to establish the fact that their submergence in
at-large elections from the metropolitan county denied equal protection. "But we
have deemed the validity of multi-member district systems justiciable, recognizing
also that they may be subject to challenge where the circumstances of a particular
case may operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population" citing earlier cases. "Such a tendency, we have
said, is enhanced when the district is large and elects a substantial proportion of the
seats in either house of a bicameral legislature, if it is multi-membered for both
houses . . . or if it lacks provision for at-large candidates running from particular
geographical districts . . ." Other cases discussing the multi-mumber districting problem were cited at 375.
"Conner v. Jackson, .... U.S ...... , 29 L. Ed. 268, 271 (1971). The brevity of the opinions
and lack of a report of the case below prevent determining the context for this statement. Mississippi had apparently employed multi-member districts freely as a matter of
state policy as recently as 1970, see 1970-1971 BooK OF THE STATES 82, 83 (19701971). The Connor case was decided four days before Whitcomb, cited above, but
in view of its emergency nature the opinions probably were written after those in
Whitcomb.
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Proponents of single-member districts are apt to make these claims:
1) The district is relatively small in area and population; this fosters
personal identification between constituent and legislator, from campaign through legislative service.
2) Lower campaign costs in the smaller district open candidacy to
people who would be precluded by the costs and rigors of running in a
larger constituency.
3) By the intimacy of constituent-legislator relations, the legislator
is kept more responsible; people know to whom they should address
their desires, and watch voting performance.
4) Localized minorities within a larger community gain representation
that would be denied them by dominant majorities of the larger constituency.
Critics of the single-member district might make these rejoinders:
1) Localized interests in the smaller district give undue advantage
to narrower interests in the legislature and discourage recognition of
larger values of the entire political community.
2) The base for recruitment of effective legislators is too narrow,
diminishing the stature of representatives and the quality of legislation.
3) The decennial problem of redefining the more numerous boundaries
of single-member districts is unduly costly and disruptive of district
continuity - except to the extent that increased opportunities for gerrymandering perpetuate representation of locally dominant groups (incompatible arguments: pick one).
Proponents of multi-member districts may also make these claims:
1) Group representation of the community fosters team action and increases community "clout" in the legislature.
2) Party responsibility for recruitment and discipline of its members
is fostered by group representation, improving quality even while achieving economies of group candidacy.
3) The larger view of things is fostered because intensity of local pressures on individual legislators is cushioned in group representation.
Proponents of single-member districting might retort that these points
simply prove their claims for better representativeness in the smaller district. They would ask how a voter can make rational choices from a list
of a dozen or two dozen candidates. 55 They would point out in some
5A simple solution to Montana's reapportionment problems was proposed by Repres. L.
Lockrem, first term Republican from Billings, late in the second special session; his H.
B. 32 [Ex. Sess 2] would have assigned fifteen senators and twenty-five representatives
to each of the state's two congressional districts with a total population variance of
less than 3.3 percent. Nothing in such a plan would violate either federal or state
constitutional standards, and by extreme example, the notion illustrated some of the
tendencies of the large multi-member districts that were created by the 1971 legislative apportionment.
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situations that at-large election from the larger district is a massive
political gerrymander by the community-wide majority. 56
This catalog of arguments, neither exhaustive nor sophisticated, is
more apt to fuel debate than to resolve the issue.57 My own preference
for Montana, stated early in the reapportionment debate, has been modified by growing disillusionment with the obfuscations that accompany
bicameralism and by my experience with practical efforts to achieve
reapportionment within the rigorous equal protection standards that
appear to govern the problem in the 1970s.
If the legislature is to remain bicameral the senate ideally should
be elected from a mixture of single-member multiple-county districts
for sparsely populated regions (to keep the districts "reasonable" in
size) and small multi-member districts for the populous centers; no
district should elect more than three senators; the house could be elected
entirely from single-member districts. Such representation would be
close to the century-old tradition in Montana - a valid tradition in my
judgment, unfortunately abandoned in 1965 - and it would maximize
the divergent bases of representation in the two chambers that is the
only persuasive modern argument for bicameralism. 5s One-man, one-vote
population standards do not prevent achieving this value of bicameralism, but I have learned that they make it difficult, at least in Montana.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to create 90 or more single-member districts of sensible coutour and content within a total population variance
of less than five or six percent; some such districts will depart from
conventional notions about what sensible districts should be.
I have also learned, by drafting such a plan, that a senate of 40
to 45 members can be elected from sensibly compact single-member
5Plaintiff's complaint at § IX, Wold v. Anderson, Civil No. 939 (D. Mont. April 8,
1971).
7Discussion of the relative values of single-member versus multi-member representation is neither extensive nor notably useful. But see: M. JEWELL, supra note 49 at
20-24; M. Jewell and S. Patterson, supra note 21 at ch. 3; W. Keefe and M. Ogul,
supra note 20 at ch. 3; D. LEHTHOLD, THE EFFECT OF MULTI-MEMBER DISTRICTS ON
STATE LEGISLATURES (processed, and distributed in the Montana Legislative Assembly,
1965); 10 Nomos, REPRESENTATION (1968), esp. DIXON, REPRESENTATION VALUES
AND REAPPORTIONMENT PRACTICE: THE ESCHATOLOGY OF 'ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE', 167195; A. DEGRAzA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1962); R.
DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION (1968); R. Silva, Compared Values of the
Single- and the Multi-Member Legislative District, 17 W. POL. Q. 504 (1964). In
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra note 53, n. 33 at 382, n. 38 at 384, Mr. Justice White,
speaking for the majority cites discussions of the alternative kinds of districts and
concludes that ''the comparative merits [1] of the two approaches to metropolitan
representation has been much mooted and is still in contention."

r8Waldron, What Kind of Legislature? 3 MONT. BUS. Q. 111-123 (1965); Waldron,
supra note 48 at 14; Waldron, Beapportionment and Political Partisanship in the
1966 Montana Legislative Elections, 4 MONTANA Bus. Q. 4, 11-28 (1966); and
Waldron, Apportionment for the 1970s, 5 MONTANA PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT (Feb.
1969), Bureau of Government Research, University of Montana. I drafted the singlemember district apportionments introduced late in the 1971 Legislative Assembly (H.
B. 37 reintroduced as H. B. 41, Ex. Sess. I; H. B. 27, Ex. Sess. II, 42d Legislative
Assembly, 1971), to specifications requested by their legislative sponsors, because I
shared their reservations about the constitutionality and desirability of the multimember plans then before the legislature.
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districts with quite minimal population variances - perhaps as little
as three precent between the largest and smallest districts. Many such
senate districts can then be split into two sensible single-member house
districts of nearly equal population, but some cannot be so subdivided;
these latter could be left as two-member house districts and the plan
would pass legal muster if the rationale was systematically applied in all
parts of the state. The plan would not achieve maximum differentiation
between senate and house constituencies, but it can meet very narrow
equal protection standards.
Thus for various reasons I now would prefer a single chamber of
not more than about 75 members, all elected from single-member districts. I think a legislature of 50, or even of 40, members might represent
the state adequately, but some districts would be territorially quite large,
and some might have to combine rural populations with major populations centers in undesirable ways. There would be a strong sense of
loss of representation in a unicameral legislature of only 40 or 50 members, and no legislature can rise far above the public expectation for it.
WHAT AGENCY SHOULD REAPPORTION?

Not the legislature. The modern state constitutions - those redrafted
during the reapportionment revolution of the past decade - furnish
startling support for the proposition that the constitutional tradition
giving legislatures the responsibility was probably a mistake, if the
standard of equal representation for equal populations is to be taken
seriously.5 9
If we add the selective Pennsylvania constitutional revision of 1968
to our group of "modern" state constitutions, half of the drafts (seven
states) placed responsibility for districting and apportionment in a
commission outside the legislature, while five others acknowledged the
probability of legislative failure by arranging for a back-up commission or the state supreme court to finish the job. Only two left the
traditional arrangement undisturbed.
There are two rather simple and interrelated reasons why some
agency other than the legislature should initiate and accomplish reapportionment.
1) Reapportionment poses a fundamental dilemma of representation
for the elected representative when it must be done to the standard of
equal representation of equal populations. Since people move around, the
process of reapportionment periodically redistributes representation,
taking increments of "voting power" from some constituencies and giv"Two principal historical surveys, McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT

(1965) and DiXoN,
supra note 57 differ in their judgment of the extent
to which this was the prevailing standard from the time of the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787; see their early chapters.
4VA. CONST. art. II, § 6 and Ida. (1970 Const. Draft) art. III, § 4 left the responsibility in the legislature.
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION,
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ing increments to others. The representative of the losing constituency
is asked to approve something that seems directly contrary to the interest of the constituency he is elected to protect; it is difficult to justify
such an act either to himself or to his constituents. Justice Frankfurter
and others who would have left this problem to the voters in the "political thicket" were asking some constituents, or their representatives,
voluntarily to surrender voting power to others - an equally unpromising process. 61
2) Why should legislators, any more than judges or governors or
the president or aldermen determine the political base and ground rules
by which they enter and hold elective office? The tradition of checks
and balances in our constitutional system usually hedges fundamental
exercise of political power by a check from some other branch of government, but no such checks were designed for the legislature in its
decennial task of reallocating representative power. British practice has
put the matter in the hands of an independent boundary commission,
and Ohio turned it over to an ex officio council of elected state officers
(not necessarily an ideal solution, but at least an external check) 120
years ago, in 1851.62 More than a third of the states now have followed
suit, at least to the extent of designating a back-up agency to finish the
job when the legislature fails.
The judiciary has fashioned one kind of check by accepting jurisdiction of the reapportionment question as a problem of equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. But it does not follow that the judiciary should assume primary responsibility for accomplishing the task.
Here are summaries of constitutional provisions for apportioning
agencies in a dozen modern constitutional drafts:
1)

Placing responsibility outside the legislature:

CONST. art. VI sections 8-11: A five-member "reapportionment
board" appointed by the governor "in an advisory capacity to him"
(one member from each of four designated regions) and "without regards to political affiliations" drafts "a plan for reapportionment and
districting."
ALASKA

CONST. art III, section 4: A five-member "board of apportionment" comprising the governor as chairman, the attorney-general and
secretary of state (both elected state officials) and two others, nonlegislators, one named by each legislative house, "shall divide the state
into house and senate [single-member] districts" to become effective
ARKANSAS

6'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting):
''Appeal must be to an informed, civically militant electorate. In a democratic society
like ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the
conscience of the people's representatives."
Or did the esteemed justice expect the
consciences of representatives of the over-represented constituencies to be seared by
some one else's constituents in the under-represented districtst
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 11 (1851).
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unless the state supreme court revises "any arbitrary action or abuse
of discretion by the board."
HAWAII CONST. art. III, section 4: A nine-member "legislative reapportionment commission" by six-vote majority submits a plan to the state
elections officer, effective on publication. The majority leaders of each
legislative chamber each designate two commissioners, and the minority
leaders of each chamber each designate one member; these two in turn
designate two more; these eight elect a ninth person to serve as chairman. On each island an advisory council advises the commission "for
matters affecting its island unit."
MICHIGAN CONST. art. IV, section 6: A nine-member "commission on legislative apportionment" is "to district and apportion the senate and house
of representatives" effective after publication and hearings. Each major
party "state organization" designates four commissioners (one each from
four designated regions) who elect a ninth member to serve as chairman.
If no majority is mustered for a plan, all commissioners may submit
plans to the state supreme court which then orders adoption of the
plan which "complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements."
CONST. art. II, section 17: A five-member "legislative
commission"
files a "preliminary" reapportionment plan
apportionment
with the state elections officer; this becomes law in 30 days if no exceptions are filed; the state supreme court may remand the preliminary
plan to the commission, with instructions. If a majority of the commission fails to agree with a plan the state supreme court proceeds "on its
own motion to reapportion the commonwealth." The majority and minority leaders of each legislative chamber, "or deputies appointed by each
of them" as commissioners select a fifth to serve as commission chairman; if they fail to agree on a chairman, the fifth member is designated
by a majority of the supreme court justices.
PENNSYLVANIA

(1968 Const. Draft) art. III, sections 3.05, 3.06: A nine-member "commission on legislative redistricting" prepares a plan which the
governor submits 'to the legislature when it convenes; "If any other plan
has not been prescribed by law within 70 days . . . then the commission
plan shall become law." The state court of appeals has original jurisdiction
to review any legislative plan; if it is found to be invalid, the commission plan becomes effective, unless it in turn is found to be invalid;
in that eventuality the court of appeals must "grant appropriate relief"
for impending elections. The majority and minority leaders of each
legislative chamber each designate two commissioners and the governor
appoints a ninth commissioner as chairman. The commission operates
by majority vote.
MARYLAND

(1967 Draft) art. III, section 2: A five-member "redistricting
commission" drafts reapportionment plans for legislative and congressional seats that "have the force and effect of law" execpt as the state
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court of appeals might review them for conformity to constitutional
standards. The temporary senate president, assembly speaker, and minority party leaders in each house each designate a commissioner and the
chairman is designated by the state court of appeals.
In addition to the states here noted, four others - Arizona, Missouri, New Jersey and Ohio - place responsibility for reapportionment
6 3
in a commission or with designated state elective officers.
2)

"Back-up" Agency if Legislature Fails:

CONNECTICUT CONST. art. III, section 6 (a) If legislature (by two-thirds
vote of each house [!]), fails to district and apportion, an eight-member
"commission" (senate and house majority and minority leaders each
designate two members) prepares a plan. If six of the eight fail to agree
upon a plan, the house speaker and house minority leader each designate
a superior court judge to serve on a three-member board; the two judges
select "an elector" as third board member; the board, by a majority of
two, develops a plan which becomes law.
FLORIDA CONST. art. III, section 16 (a) : If legislature fails to reapportion
by adjournment, the governor reconvenes them in special session limited
to reapportionment business "and it shall be the mandatory duty of the
legislature to adopt a joint resolution of apportionment." But if this
fails, the state attorney general petitions the supreme court to get the
job done.
CONST. art. IV, section 3: If legislature fails to reapportion
by June 30, an 8-member "legislative redistricting commission" is to
submit a plan by August 10. The house speaker and minority leader
and senate president and minority leader each designate a legislator and
another member to the commission, which acts by majority of five. If
this commission fails the secretary of state draws one of two persons
designated by the state supreme court, to function as a ninth commission member and they try again to develop a plan by October 5.
ILLINOIS

(1969 Const. Draft) art. III, section 5: If the legislature
fails, the governor would appoint a five-member "reapportionment commission" to submit a plan to the state supreme court within 90 days
"for approval as to legal sufficiency and compliance with this article."
The court-approved plan would become law.
NEW MExIco

In addition to the "back-up" agencies noted for these four states,
California, North Dakota and Texas constitutions specify a commission
or state elective and/or judicial officers to assume the responsibility.4

§ 1 (1); Mo. CONST. art. III, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. IV,
q 3, Pt. 1; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 11.
"CALIF. CONST. art. VI, § 4; N. DAK. CONST. art. II, § 35; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 10;
ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 6; S. DAK. CONST. art. III, § 5; TEx. CONST. art. III,§ 28.
8ARIz CONST. art. IV, Pt. 1,
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Several general observations are warranted:
1) The constitutions of at least 19 states now recognize that some
agency other than the legislature is required either to initiate or to
complete the reapportionment process.
2) Nearly all of these arrangements acknowledge the bipartisan
political nature of the problem 6 and attempt to achieve a reasonable
balance of partisan representation in the apportioning agency which
then proceeds by a designated majority vote. Connecticut, requiring
exceptional majorities at successive stages, evidently expects trouble
and has a back-up agency for the back-up agency.
3) Most arrangements indicate a desire to have the job done by a
special bipartisan commission or board rather than by a court.
4) Because ultimate resort to the courts must be anticipated in any
arrangement, involvement of supreme court justices in the reapportionment process prior to this review is undesirable. For supreme court
judges to participate in selection of members of the apportioning agency
might also be questioned, but such arrangements at least do not involve
the justices in the substance of plans before they reach the court for
review.
5) Some states preclude office-holders or elected officials
service on apportionment commissions, but others involve elective
officials as ex officio members of the commissions. 6 There are also
provisions that prevent members of the apportionment commissions
holding or seeking legislative office for a designated period after
task is completed.61

from
state
some
from
their

Among the various plans, the Maryland and Pennsylvania provisions
for constituting the apportionment commission particularly appeal to
me as appropriate for Montana. And the provision of the Maryland 1968
Draft Constitution for submission of the commission plan to the legislature with the commission plan to become effective unless the legislature adopts an alternative or agrees upon amendments to the commission plan, retains a role for the legislators, gives them a model to
work from, and gets the job done if they fail to exercise their option.
DzmOCRATiC R-RESRENTATiON, supra note 57, ch. 13, 14, reviews state experience
with apportionment commissions of various kinds and concludes, at 380: "To be
avoided at all costs is the bemused idea that 'nonpartisan' apportionments are posEven if the actual apportioners be conceived as nonpartisan (a concept
sible ....
akin to the idea of the 'Second Coming' itself), every line drawn wittingly or unwittingly will have an apportionment political effect different from another line
which is equally 'equal' and equally available. Balanced, bipartisan apportioners are
the best guarantors of balanced and fair apportionments.'' (Emphasis in original).
"ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; and Md. (1968 Const. Draft)
art. III, § 3.05 preclude service by elected officials. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 4 involves three elected state officials and two non-legislators; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3
involves four legislators, four non-legislators.
"HAwAn CONST. art. III, § 4 precludes legislative candidacy of commission members
in the first two elections under their plan; MICH. CONsT. art. IV, § 6 precludes
legislative service until two years after adoption of the reapportionment.

ODIxo,
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This was the arrangement contemplated in HJR 48 of the 1971
Montana Legislative Assembly. I drafted the resolution and was pleased
that it got to second reading after a favorable vote in the house reapportionment committee. I commend the plan to the constitutional convention, happy to leave details of commission composition and operation
to its collective judgment.
One final word: The Maryland arrangement for a commission plan
to become law unless changed by the legislature raises the question of
"delegated legislation" if left to statute; but a constitution clearly can
authorize and direct such an arrangement.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REAPPORTIONMENT

Most of the modern state constitutions expressly provide for judicial
involvement in reapportionment, and several kinds of concerns are evident. We have noted instances in which the highest state court is made
an integral part of the process, at least as a back-up agency. A number
of the other constitutions recognize that judicial review of reapportionment is a probability and expressly grant original jurisdiction in the
highest state court." Several constitutions set particular time limits with
either of two purposes: to expedite the process where judicial involvement is an indispensable element in getting the job done,6 9 or to limit
the time within which a voter may challenge a reapportionment, in
70
order to "quiet the title" in the matter.
Several state constitutions give "exclusive" jurisdiction to state
courts in reapportionment matters. 71 Such a provision probably does not
preempt jurisdiction of a federal court disposed to review a state ap7 2
portionment for equal protection standards.
The past decade has made judicial involvement in reapportionment a
common expectation even when the state constitution is silent about that
matter. To expedite judicial review there may be utility in an express
6ARK. CONST. art. III, § 4 (c); HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3;
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; Ida. (1970 Const. Draft) art. III, § 4; Md. (1968 Const.
Draft) art. III, § 3.06; N. Mex. (1969 Const. Draft) art. III, § 5E; R. I. (1968
Const. Draft) art. IV, § 5; N.M.L. MODEL CONST. art. 4.04 (c).
OALAsKA CONST. art. VI, § 11 gives 30 days for voter action to compel performance
by apportionment commission or governor; FLA. COYST. art. III, § 16 (c, e, f) give 15
to 60 days to compel certain performances; MICH. CONST. art IV, § 6 gives 60 days
to compel certain performances.
'This seems to be involved in ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 11, 30 days for trial court of
general jurisdiction to review apportionment plan; HAWAII CONsT. art. III, § 4, 45 days
to review apportionment; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6, 60 days to review apportionment
commission plan.
flIpL CONST. art. IV, § 3; N. M. (1969 Const. Draft) art. III, § 5E; N.M.L. MODEL
CONST. (1963) art. IV § 4.04 (c), which may have been drafted before the U.S.
Supreme Court resolved questions of justiciability in Baker v. Carr, supra note 61.
"See supra note 31 and accompanying text. One of the strangest provisions was that
of the Ida. (1970 Const. Draft), art. III, § 4: "Whenever the [apportionment]
statute materially fails to meet the requirements for the districts the Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction to enforce compliance with this section [defining
standards of compactness, contiguity and equal populations]." Who but the court
determines that the statute "fails to meet the requirements''?
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grant of original jurisdiction to the state's highest court, but it may
be doubted whether an attempt to make this jurisdiction "exclusive"
can preempt federal court jurisdiction. A constitutional time limit for
initiation of judicial challenge in the state courts may tend to stabilize
expectations under a particular apportionment, but no attempt is made
here to resolve the question whether such a limitation would foreclose
federal court involvement after the time limit had expired for action
in a state court.
SOME FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
FREQUENCY OF SESSION

The first state legislatures commonly met annually, and the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution said "the legislature ought frequently to
assemble for redress of grievances, for correcting, strengthening and
confirming the laws, and for making new laws, as the common good
may require. '75 But by 1900 constitutional provisions in 43 states allowed
the legislature to meet in regular session no more frequently than every
other year. Moreover, many of the states imposed limits on the length
of sessions. In 1950, half of the states still limited the length of session
either by specification of the maximum number of days, or by limitation
of the number of days for which service would be compensated. Among
eleven western mountain and Pacific states, a biennial legislative session
of not more than 60 days was very nearly universal.7 4 In 1950, the
legislature met in regular annual session in only six states - California
and five eastern seaboard states whose legislatures dated from the 18th
century (Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and South
Carolina) .75
These Constitutional limitations on the frequency and length of
sessions were the most obvious and effective expressions of distrust of
state legislatures that developed in the latter half of the 19th century.
Such limitations, often quite reasonable when they were adopted,
limit severely not only the legislature's opportunities for deliberation but the effectiveness of its committees and the ability of less
senior members to develop experience and to become acquainted
with legislative norms. No single factor has a greater effect on
the legislative environment than the constitutional restriction on
the length of sessions."

John Burns, for the Citizens Conference on the State Legislatures,
writes: "The amount of work to be done at any given time - and

7B.
Zeller, supra note 16 at 89.
74
Only California had annual sessions without time limit, but the subject-matter of
alternate sessions was limited; Colorado had biennial sessions without time limit;
60-day biennial sessions were the rule in Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, Washington, Idaho and Montana; Oregon had a 50-day biennial session, and Wyoming a

40-day biennial session. North and South Dakota also had 60-day biennial sessions.

'-BOOK O1 THE STATES,
PRocEss, 169 (1948).

106

(1948-1949),

"Jewell and Patterson, supra note 57 at 138.
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not any fixed and arbitrary rule '77
lative session lasts.

should determine how long a legis-

In 1966 the Montana-Idaho Assembly on State Legislatures stated
its first and most important recommendation: "There was substantial
agreement that constitutional restrictions on the length of legislative
sessions should be removed and that legislators should be free to determine the frequency and length of legislative sessions." 78
The Montana Legislative Assembly evidently agreed in some measure; by two-thirds vote in 1967 it proposed a constitutional amendment
to extend the length of biennial session to 80 days. 9 But no one assumed
responsibility for presenting the issue to the voters, while a small group
of lobbyists mounted a campaign of shabby scare-advertisements opposing the amendment in the days just before the 1968 election. The
80-day amendment was defeated. This rebuff undoubtedly heightened
legislative awareness that systematic approaches to improvement of
its working conditions were needed, and fed the movement for general
constitutional revision. Decisions of the 1972 constitutional convention
regarding frequency and length of legislative sessions will be among the
most important it will make.
There has been notable movement in the constitutional patterns
governing legislative sessions during the past decade; release of state
legislatures from limitations on sessions may be one of the principal
concomitants of the reapportionment revolution. By 1970 a majority
(26) of the states had provided for annual legislative sessions, and 21
states imposed no limitation on the length of session. Three others had
session limits of no less than 140 days. 80 The following table compares
the situation in 1950 and 1970, for fifteen western states:
Legislative Session Limitations, 15 western sta tes, 1950 and 1970

Alaska ...............
Arizona ..............
California .............................
Colorado ...............................
Hawaii ..................................
Idaho .....................................
Montana .............
New Mexico ..........
North Dakota .........
Nevada ..............
Oregon ...............
South Dakota .........
Utah ......................................
Washington ..........
W yoming ..............................

Sessions
biennial
biennial
annual
biennial
biennial
biennial
biennial
biennial
biennial
biennial
biennial
biennial
biennial
biennial
biennial

1950
Days
60
60
no limit
no limit
60
60
60
60
60
60
50
60
60
60
40

rrBurns, supra note 49 at 58.
"Montana-Idaho Assembly on State Legislatures, REPORT
(December 1966).
"1967 Laws, c. 248.
9BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 75 at 66-67.
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Sessions
annual
annual
annual
annual
annual
annual
biennial
annual
biennial
biennial
biennial
biennial
annual
biennial
biennial

AND

1970
Days
no limit
no limit
no limit
180
60 legis.
60
60
60
60 legis.
60
no limit
45 legis.
60
60
40
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Every one of our group of "modern" state constitutions provides
for an annual legislative session; among the states whose draft constitutions were rejected the annual session either existed previously or has
been adopted by special amendment."' Half of the constitutions in this
group provide no limit on the duration of sessions (Alaska, Illinois,
Michigan, Idaho Draft, New York, Rhode Island Draft, National Municipal League 1963 Model) and most of those that set some limit on duration would extend earlier limitations to allow longer sessions. 82 Of
particular interest in this group are provisions that allow the legislature
itself to extend the session rather than "cover the clock". The modern
constitutions also contain provisions for the legislature to convene itself
in special session: in Connecticut and the Idaho and Rhode Island draft
constitutions, by a majority of members of each house; in Arkansas,
Florida and the Maryland draft constitution, by three-fifths of the
members; in Alaska, Hawaii, Virginia and the New Mexico draft constitution, by two thirds of the members. In Illinois and the Maryland
draft constitution, legislative officers may convene a special session.
The conventional power of the governor to convene special sessions is
essentially undisturbed, and in Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois and
Michigan as now in Montana, the governor may limit the subject matter
8 3
to be considered in the special session.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT ON LENGTH OF SESSION

My comparison of the Montana legislature with two others I have
observed operating without time limits convinces me that no single
factor has more insidious effect on the quality of legislative process
than a rigorous constitutional restriction on length of session. If the
notion that a biennial 60-day session could accomplish state business
made any sense in Montana three generations ago, modern pressures
have simply overwhelmed the rationale of the limitation. Any recent
session of the Montana legislative assembly has tried to cope with as
many measures as the first three sessions of this century.
MALASA CONST. art. II, § 8; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 9; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 2;
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 3(b); HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. IV, §
5(a); MICH. CONST. art. IV,§ 13; VA. CoNST. art. IV, § 6; Ida. (1970 Const. Draft)
art. III, § 11; Md. (1968 Const. Draft) art. III, § 3.15; N. M. (1969 Const. Draft)
art. III, § 6; N. Y. (1967 Const. Draft) art. III, § 4a; R. I. (1968 Const. Draft)
art. IV, § 6; N. M. L. MODEL CONST. (1963) art. II, § 4.
"ARK. CONST. art III, § 9 (60 days but three-fifths vote may extend); CONN. CONST.
art. III, § 2 (alternate five-month and four-month sessions); FLA. CONST. art. III,
§ 3(d) (60 days but three-fifths vote may extend); HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 11
(60 legis. days plus 15 by two-thirds vote); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (60 days plus
30 by majority vote plus 30 by three-fifths vote); Md. (1968 Const. Draft) art. III,
§ 3.15 (90 days plus 30 by majority vote plus 30 by three-fifths vote); N. M. (1969
Const. Draft) art. III, § 6 (115 days of per diem payment in biennium, not including
special sessions).
8ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 9; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 10; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 2;
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 3; HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 5;
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 28; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 6; Ida. (1970 Const. Draft) art.
III, § 11; Md. (1968 Const. Draft) art. III, § 3.15; N. M. (1969 Const. Draft) art.
III, § 7; R. I. (1968 Const. Draft) art. IV, § 6; N. M. L. MODEL CONST. (1963)
art. IV, § 4.08; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
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The legislators have been trying to tell the people about the problem, and I think increasing numbers of people have been listening. But
the campaign of national legislative reformers on behalf of annual sessions - aimed largely at the needs of populous, industrious and seaboard
states whose biennial sessions are either long or unlimited in length can obscure the fact that frequency of session and length of session are
related but separable problems.
Happily, the constitutional convention need not choose between
allowing annual sessions and removing the 60-day limit on session length.
But if it were to choose, the worse choice in my judgment would be for
annual sessions of 60 days, rather than biennial sessions without time
limit. My concern about the alternatives is not groundless when Idaho,
New Mexico and Utah have made the other choice for annual 60-day
sessions in recent years. This is apt to be the "compromise" position of
groups that really have no desire to open up the legislative process at all,
but sense they must give ground somewhere. It is conceivable to me that
annual repetition of the frustrations of a 60-day limited session would
only deepen disillusionment with the ability to achieve good legislative
operation.
On this point I stand with the Montana legislature which proposed
to lengthen biennial sessions, rather than with reform groups like the
Citizens Conference on the State Legislature that has simplistically beat
the drum for annual session, across the land, while virtually ignoring
problems of the short session. Unwittingly, "cultural overhang" from
national reform groups has reinforced the position of powerfully-placed
special interests who find the frantic pace of a 60-day session tailormade
for their "defensive style" politics. We are talking about the other leg
of the 19th century inheritance that supports bicameralism for its
84
utility in bushwhacking innovation.
The haste and confusion and proneness to error inherent in a 60calendar-day session seem too obvious to describe here. The point I
make is that this constitutional limitation, overlaid upon basic facts of
Montana geography and mechanics of the media prevent effective communication between legislator and constituent once a 60-day session
"As a member of the Montana Citizens Conference on the State Legislature in its
earlier years, I shared the agonies of that group when its simplistic reflection of the
national focus collided with the legislative proposal for an 80-day biennial session;
some lobbyist-members of the group almost got the Montana Citizens Conference to
oppose the legislature's proposal, and the best it finally managed was an embarrassed,
luke-warm endorsement of the proposed amendment. The reader who questions my
characterization of reform group emphasis is invited to review the literature of the
National Citizens Conference, the Council of State Governments. and the National
Municipal League during the past five years. See Burns, supra note 49 which almost
ignores the short-session problem except at 103-104, (where he misses its essence) and
at 127-130 talks about improving "the level of competence" as a protection against
undue lobbyist influence but ignores the problem of time impaction in a short session.
Note its curious prescription for Montana, at 249: constitutional amendment "to permit annual general sessions, limited to no fewer than 90 legislative days." Would the
legislature have to stay around that long whether it needed to or not?
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begins. Montana legislators commonly complain that constituents tell
them nothing during a session but plenty afterwards. How can a citizen
know what is going on in that frantic 60-day pressure cooker a hundred
or more miles away, when even experienced members of the body itself
have to scramble to keep track of their own proposed bills, their frequent and often conflicting committee obligations and the long, trying
hours in formal sessions that roll on unremittingly, seven days a week,
through most of the short session?
The legislator rarely gets home to talk with. constituents after the
early weeks of the session because "home" is at least a day's trip away;
for many it is a day's trip each way. The distance is the same for his
constituents. Those who muster energy and organize affairs for a visit
to the capitol spend a whole day, often two, and incur substantial travel
and accommodation bills, only to find that they may be given five minutes before a committee meeting in an attic room filled with stale air
and a scrambling sense of urgency. Such a visit assumes in the first
place that the constituent knows when to come. The legislator has time
for client service to only a few of the most insistent constituents, so
the citizen who lacks contact with the process through a hired legislative agent will simply not know what is going on until it is all over. Thefn,
if the media regard it to be a matter of widespread concern, he may read
about it or hear about it but the odds are not good even for such communication in the 60-day "time-frame."
The essential fact is that information about bills and committee
meetings and calendars posted on the morning of the day is so scattered,
so transient, so sudden, so quickly past that only a full-time legislative
agent operating on the scene can keep up with it. The essential fact about
a 60-day session is that it unduly inflates the dependence of everyone,
citizen and legislator alike, upon a fairly small cadre of skilled, virtually
full-time legislative agents-for-hire.
The citizen who can afford to hire a lobbyist gets represented; few
can afford this, so the tendency of all public affairs to respond only to
organized group pressures is accentuated; and that puts everybody inordinately in the hands of the professional lobbyist.
I am not criticizing the lobbyists; most of their operations, most of
the time, are legitimate and, in the circumstances, indispensable. I am
criticizing an aspect of the Montana legislative system that makes
everyone, citizen and legislator alike, so utterly dependent upon the
presence and services of those who can stand in lobbies and committee
rooms for substantial portions of a session.
I do not expect many of the perennial lobbyists skilled in manipulating this time-impacted system, to sell short their stock-in-trade by supporting sessions of unlimited duration. They will point to the possibility
that an unlimited session would just go on and on at great cost to the
taxpayer. This threat can be controlled by an annual salary and modest
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1972
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per diem which minimizes the legislator's interest in just staying on in
Helena.
Sadly, I do not even expect many legislators to be sharply critical.
of the existing system because few of them have seen a legislature
that works on a more open, leisurely, deliberative schedule; others, unwittingly, have fallen into comfortable dependence upon the friendly
lobbyist whose information is better organized and more discreetly
presented than the importunacies of constituents from home. The legislator comes to be comfortable with the skilled lobbyist - I imply nothing
improper in that relationship - and somewhat impatient with the
amateur or less skilled occasional visitor from home who knows what
he wants but counts on the legislator to tell him how to get it. The
full-time professional lobbyist, by contrast, can tell the legislator how to
get what the lobbyist and his particular "public" wants.
These contexts are not peculiar to the short-session legislature, but
they acquire unusual poignancy in that context. The committee process
is the constituted place for resolving such problems. But the Montana
legislature maintains a rule that all measures should pass through committee within seven days. 5 Some legislatures with more work time give
that much advance notice for committee hearings.
During the 1971 session I was invited four times by committee chairmen to testify before their committees: each time I would be a friendly
witness with something presumably useful to say. Each visit involved
a motor trip of 250 miles with two wintry crossings of the Continental
Divide. Each time I received a telephone call that gave me less than 24
hours to arrange my affairs and make the trip. I mention my experience
only because I think it was more typical than exceptional. The chairmen involved, courteous and friendly men, saw nothing exceptional in
the timing of their invitations.
This is a miserable way to bring interested citizens into contact
with their legislators, and a desperate way to try to get useful information into the legislative "mix". The fault lies with a constitutional
provision that requires the legislature to proceed hammer-and-tongs for
sixty unremitting days in a style that virtually precludes sensible legislator-constituent relations; and makes open flow of a wide variety of
useful information virtually impossible, once the pressure gets up in the
legislative cooker.
I am simply trying to say that if session limits were relaxed: so
that the legislator had more time, meeting perhaps only four days most
weeks so that he could frequently or routinely return home and talk
with constituents on weekends; so that committee processes including

85The fact that this rule is frequently waived by unanimous consent demonstrates that
it is essentially a poor rule; but it is retained because it ''makes sense'' in relation
to the 60-day session limit.
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public hearings could be scheduled in advance; so that citizens would
have time to arrange affairs and find the long costly journey to Helena
rewarding; so that calendars could be prepared one or two days in
advance; so that media could communicate the imminence of events
rather than only their consummation-more people and more information
then could get into the process on more meaningful terms than is now
possible.
COMPENSATION

Frequency and duration of session must be considered in relationship
to provisions for compensation for legislators. The modern tendency to
convene legislatures annually and to remove limits on the duration of
sessions is reflected in the prevailing pattern of modern constitutions
86
to provide an annual salary with the amount fixed by statute. Most
also provide for per diem expenses or allowances in amount fixed by
statute.8 7 Several also make express provision for payment of transportation expenses in amounts to be fixed by statute. 88
I think that Montana legislators should receive an annual salary,
"moderate" or "reasonable" in amount, with the level determined by
statute from time to time. The level should be sufficient to make legislative service possible, if not attractive, to broader groups of citizens
than are presently recruited to such service. Adequate compensation is
imperative if younger professional and business people are to be attracted
to legislative service. Some control over the length of legislative sessions
might be exercised by a limit on the number of days for which per diem
expense allowances would be made. The New Mexico Draft Constitution
of 196989 would have limited per diem allowances to 115 days during a
biennium, plus days engaged in interim legislative activities. This limitation is unduly restrictive, and it would be better to leave such a limit
to statute rather than constitutional provision. The present Montana

8

1ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 7; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 17;
HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 10; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 11; MICH. COST. art. IV, § 12
(mentions compensation rather than salary); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 5; Ida. (1970
Const. Draft) art. III, § 9; Md. (1968 Const. Draft) art. III, § 3.12; N. M. (1969
Const. Draft) art. III, § 6; N. Y. (1967 Const. Draft) art. III, § 3; R. I. (1968
Const. Draft) art. IV, § 13; N. M. L. MODEL CONST. (1963) art. IV, § 4.07.
'ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 7; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 7 (compare its Schedule I);
HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 10 ("reasonable expense allowances"); ILL. CONST. art.
IV, § 11 ("allowances"); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 12 ("expense allowances"); VA.
CONST. art. IV, § 5 ("allowances"); Ida. (1970 Const. Draft) art. III, § 9 ("allowances"); N. M. (1969 Const. Draft) art. III, § 6; N. Y. (1967 Const. Draft)
art. III, § 3 ("actual and necessary expenses"); N. M. L. MODEL CONST. (1963)
art. IV, § 4.07 ("allowances"). Md. (1968 Const. Draft) art. III, § 3.12, authorized
to be fixed by statute but prohibited per diem payments during regu"allowances"
lar sessions.
UCoNN. CONST. art. III, § 17; ALASKA CONST. art. II § 7; N. M. (1969 Const. Draft)
art. III, § 6 (one round trip); ARK. CONST. Schedule I provided eight cents per mile
for a weekly round trip.
90N. M. (1969 Const. Draft) art. III, § 6.
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practice to reimburse per diem expenses and actual travel at a level
fixed by statute seems satisfactory.90
The state constitution commonly contains some provision limiting
the capacity of legislators to increase their compensation during a
current session.9 1 The current Montana provision that "no legislative
assembly shall fix its own compensation" is probably adequate 2
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
I would like a chance to ratify a constitution that contained this
kind of legislative article:
1) A unicameral legislature with about 75 members elected from
single member districts that would be revamped each decade by a bipartisan apportionment commission, preserving the legislative opportunity to try to revise its proposals,
2) meeting regularly in January of odd-numbered years and other
times at its own call or the call of its leaders, for sessions unrestricted in
length except by
3) annual salary and modest per diem expense reimbursements
and ample travel reimbursements to encourage frequent visits home
during session; and
4) minimal language authorizing conventional legislative immunities and broadly granting authority of the legislature by statute and
rule to accommodate its processes for maximum use of all the technology
that can serve it.
Given these elements I am prepared to trust the kind of people
Montanans will elect to legislative service, to create a legislative institution notably more flexible and responsive than the one imposed upon
us by the archaic fears and improvisations of the late 19th Century. In
thinking about a new constitution these items are central in importance
for a modern legislature.

"°Currently, Montana legislators receive $20 per day plus $25 per day for expenses
incurred in attending the session, payable weekly during the session, and nine cents
per mile for travel between home and place of session by nearest traveled route. RO.M.
1947, § 43-310.
1
' ARK. CONST. art. IV, § 7; HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 10; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 11;
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 12; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 5; Ida. (1970 Const. Draft) art.
III, § 9; Md. (1968 Const. Draft) art. III, § 3.12; N. Y. (1967 Const. Draft) art.
III, § 3; R. I. (1968 Const. Draft) art. IV, § 13; N. M. L. MODEL CONsT. (1963)
art. IV, § 4.07.
0MONT. CONST. art. V, § 5.
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